Interrogating scarcity: How to think about ‘resource-scarce settings’ by Schrecker T
Interrogating scarcity: how to think about
‘resource-scarce settings’
Ted Schrecker
Bruye`re Research Institute and Department of Epidemiology and Community Medicine, University of Ottawa, 43 Bruye`re Street, Ottawa,
ON, K1N 5C8, Canada. Tel: þ1-613-612 8485. E-mail: tschrecker@sympatico.ca
Accepted 10 May 2012
The idea of resource scarcity permeates health ethics and health policy analysis in
various contexts. However, health ethics inquiry seldom asks—as it should—why
some settings are ‘resource-scarce’ and others not. In this article I describe
interrogating scarcity as a strategy for inquiry into questions of resource allocation
within a single political jurisdiction and, in particular, as an approach to the issue
of global health justice in an interconnected world. I demonstrate its relevance to
the situation of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) with brief descriptions
of four elements of contemporary globalization: trade agreements; the worldwide
financial marketplace and capital flight; structural adjustment; imperial geopol-
itics and foreign policy. This demonstration involves not only health care, but
also social determinants of health. Finally, I argue that interrogating scarcity
provides the basis for a new, critical approach to health policy at the interface
of ethics and the social sciences, with specific reference to market fundamentalism
as the value system underlying contemporary globalization.
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KEY MESSAGES
 It is not enough to consider how to set priorities in ‘resource-scarce settings’; health ethics and health policy analysis
must consider why some settings are resource-scarce and others not.
 Scarcities of resources in low- and middle-income countries, in particular, must be understood with reference to the ways
in which economic activity has been reorganized across national borders (globalization), and the choices driving that
reorganization.
 Interrogating scarcity is a valuable strategy not only for developing that understanding, but also for examining how the
values of market fundamentalism infuse the construction of scarcity in specific policy contexts and showing that neither
disease causation nor health ethics can be separated from politics.
Introduction
The idea of resource scarcity permeates health ethics1 and
health policy analysis, whether the context is the micro-level of
selecting interventions in a clinical setting, the meso-level of
allocating resources within a regional organization, or the
macro-level of choosing among options for reducing the global
burden of disease. Consider three real-life situations:
(1) Researchers select the most cost-effective package of
interventions to reduce maternal mortality in ‘resource-
scarce settings’ based on per capita budgets as low as
US$0.50 per year for maternal health (Prata et al. 2010).
The need for such interventions is acute: approximately
350 000 women die every year in pregnancy and childbirth,
almost exclusively in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) (Abou Zahr et al. 2010; Hogan et al. 2010).
(2) A questionnaire distributed by ethics researchers asks
participants at a Canadian government conference on
public health ethics to respond to this hypothetical: ‘You
are the Medical Officer of Health2 of a large health unit that
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must make dramatic budget cuts. You need to decide how to
cut services and programs’ (Pakes and Upshur 2007).
(3) Critics of the US$8–10 billion per year spent worldwide on
AIDS prevention and treatment argue that the amount is
excessive because so much less is spent on such
health-related objectives as providing clean water in
developing countries (Cheng 2008) and that lives are
being lost because spending on AIDS programmes ‘takes
resources away from other diseases’ (Easterly 2009).
The first two exercises may be operationally valuable to health
service managers who have little control over the resources
available to them, and as a result face troubling decisions.
However, operational value in such settings is not the only
objective of ethical inquiry, and such exercises and similar ones
aimed at setting priorities for treating other conditions
including breast cancer (Eniu et al. 2006) and multidrug-
resistant tuberculosis (Nathanson et al. 2006) in ‘resource-
scarce settings’ rarely ask, in a formulation patterned after the
title of a standard text in population health (Evans et al. 1994),
why some settings are resource-scarce and others not.3 In the
third situation, the zero-sum assumption that the quantum of
financial resources available for improving the health of the
poor through development assistance is somehow fixed and
immutable, in a world where (for instance) the US Department
of Defense spends US$1.5 billion daily, is not questioned.
A leading global health researcher has perceptively described
failure to ask such questions as ‘ ‘‘public health machismo,’’ the
idea that ‘‘someone has to make the decision who lives and
dies’’ . . . ’ (J Y Kim, quoted in Petryna and Kleinman 2006: 6). I
describe asking where scarcities come from and who makes the
decisions that create and maintain scarcities of resources for
health as interrogating scarcity. Interrogating scarcity, relent-
lessly and when necessary impolitely, is a central task and a
professional obligation for health ethics and health policy
analysis in all settings that are characterized by major, socio-
economically patterned disparities in health. The contemporary
preoccupation with priority-setting is disturbing in its failure to
recognize this imperative.
In the second section of the article I explain the rationale for
interrogating scarcity and briefly explore its application within
the limits of a single political jurisdiction. However, I am
mainly concerned to demonstrate the relevance of the strategy
to issues of justice across national borders, as ‘global health has
come to occupy a new and different kind of political space that
demands the study of population health in the context of power
relations in a world system’ (Janes and Corbett 2009: 168). This
demonstration, which comprises the third section of the article,
involves not only health care, but also social determinants of
health: the conditions of life and work that make it easy for
some individuals to lead long and healthy lives, and all but
impossible for others. I take as given the adequacy of the
evidence base assembled by the World Health Organization
Commission on Social Determinants of Health (2008) and other
authors (Yong Kim et al. 2000; Birn et al. 2009; Labonte´ and
Schrecker 2011). Those who doubt the adequacy of this
evidence base, despite the near ubiquity of socio-economic
gradients in health, will simply need to hold their doubts in
abeyance as they read on. (The central ethical issue here relates
to the choice of a standard of proof, a topic that merits an
article on its own.) In the final section, I argue that
interrogating scarcity provides the basis for a new, critical
approach to health policy at the interface of ethics and social
sciences, with specific reference to the neoliberalism or market
fundamentalism that is the value system underlying contem-
porary globalization.
Scepticism about scarcity
Resource scarcities that confound efforts to reduce health
disparities by providing health care or eliminating causes of
illness are rarely natural or absolute, in the sense exemplified
by shortages of compatible donor organs for transplantation or
(in a hypothetical example) of a geologically rare mineral that
cannot be synthesized and has no substitute in the manufac-
ture of a life-saving medical device. Far more common, in the
words of Calabresi and Bobbitt’s Tragic Choices, are situations in
which ‘scarcity is not the result of any absolute lack of a
resource but rather of the decision by society that it is not
prepared to forgo other goods and benefits in a number
sufficient to remove the scarcity’ (Calabresi and Bobbitt 1978:
22). Their remarkable book focused on the various mechanisms
that societies adopt to make life-and-death choices and to
rationalize, sometimes to camouflage, the underlying ethical
presumptions.
In the context of this article, as suggested by the three
examples that introduced it, ‘resources’ in the first instance are
usually financial or budgetary. The budgets in question may be
public budgets for health care provision; they may also be the
straitened budgets of households impoverished by structural
economic change, for which prerequisites of healthy living are
unaffordable. And my aim is not to provide a genealogy of the
concept of scarcity that links its current form to the work of
early economic theorists like Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus
(e.g. Xenos 1987; Boal and Martinez 2007; Samuel and Robert
2010) by way of twentieth-century microeconomics (Fine 2010;
Samuel and Robert 2010). Neither do I offer a critique of the
unreflective use of the concept that is routine in environmental
politics (Enzensberger 1974; Hartmann 2001; Hartmann 2010),
although I refer to some such critiques in the final section of
the article. My aim is more modest: demonstrating the
indispensability of Calabresi and Bobbitt’s injunction that:
‘We must determine where – if at all – in the history of a
society’s approach to the particular scarce resource a decision
substantially within the control of that society was made as a
result of which the resource was permitted to remain
scarce. . . . Scarcity cannot simply be assumed as a given’ (Calabresi
and Bobbitt 1978: 150–1; emphasis added).
Examples and potential applications are abundant. I com-
pleted the penultimate version of this article in a jurisdiction
that hosts the largest treatment and research complex in the
United States and possibly the world: the towering Texas
Medical Center (Figures 1 and 2), offering and advertising
world-class treatment for those with enough private wealth or
private insurance. At the same time, one in four Texas
residents, the highest percentage in the country, had no
health insurance in 2009 (US Census Bureau 2011). Political
leaders in the United States have chosen to leave provision of
health insurance to the market, with a residual publicly
INTERROGATING SCARCITY 401
 at D
urham
 U
niversity on July 25, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
financed (but often for-profit) sector, and to accept both the
high overall costs of health care that result and the corollary
inadequacy of provision for the un- and under-insured who
experience delayed or denied treatment, easily avoidable com-
plications and often premature death (Reynolds 2010).
The distinctive US approach, and the political arrangements
sustaining it, underscore the connection between resource
scarcity in health care settings and political choice. Texas, and
the United States, could easily afford to provide health
insurance coverage for all their residents. On one estimate,
providing coverage for all uninsured US residents would have
cost US$100 billion a year before the financial crisis hit: just
half the annual direct cost of the country’s military adventure
in Iraq (Leonhardt 2007) and a small fraction of the sums that
the US government was able to place at risk, in short order, to
bail out financial institutions (Barofsky 2009). Most other
high-income countries provide health insurance to all, or nearly
all, of their population, often with superior results in
terms both of crude outcome measures like life expectancy
and of the steepness of socio-economic gradients in health
(see e.g. Murray et al. 2006; Hertzman and Siddiqi 2008).
Calabresi and Bobbitt’s injunction directs our attention to
such variables (an oversimplified list) as a long history of
opposition to so-called socialized medicine on the part of the
medical profession, the private insurance industry and large
segments of the business community; and a regime of election
financing that magnifies the influence of such interests (Center
for Public Integrity 1995a; Center for Public Integrity 1995b;
Center for Public Integrity 1996; Quadagno 2004). It also directs
our attention to the revenue side of the equation. Texas is one
of a few states that collect no state income tax, and federal
income tax reductions during the first decade of the 21st
century reduced national government revenues by more than
US$2 trillion, with half the resulting increase in after-tax
incomes accruing to the richest 1% of taxpayers (Citizens for
Tax Justice 2009). Claims that providing access to health care
would be unaffordable cannot be isolated from political choices
about the level and incidence of taxation.
These insights do not apply only to rich countries. In 2001,
the member states of the African Union (AU) committed
themselves, without setting a target date, to increasing public
spending on health to 15% of their general government
budgets. Ten years later, only 6 of 53 AU member states had
achieved this target, with important consequences in terms (for
instance) of continued high rates of maternal and newborn
mortality (Committee of Experts of the 4th Joint Annual
Meetings of the AU Conference of Ministers of Economy and
Finance and ECA Conference of African Ministers of Finance
Planning and Economic Development 2011). AU finance min-
isters had the previous year actually urged abandonment of the
Figure 1 One of several buildings comprising the M.D. Anderson
Cancer Center, Texas Medical Center, Houston (photo: author)
Figure 2 Texas Children’s Hospital, Part of the Texas Medical Center,
Houston (photo: author)
402 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING
 at D
urham
 U
niversity on July 25, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
health spending commitment (Njora 2010). In contrast to the
situation in high-income countries, no one would seriously
suggest that most African governments, even were they to live
up to the Abuja commitment, are able on their own to finance
even minimally adequate health care for their populations
(Sachs 2007). However, this is not the end of the story. Just as
in far richer countries, using available resources and fiscal
capacity to protect health, especially the health of the poor, is
often not high on the agenda of the elites that dominate
choices about public budgets even under conditions of formal
democracy.
In an interconnected world, Calabresi and Bobbitt’s focus on
the origins of scarcity in decisions ‘substantially within the
control’ of a given society does not go far enough. Over the past
few decades globalization, ‘[a] pattern of transnational eco-
nomic integration animated by the ideal of creating
self-regulating global markets for goods, services, capital,
technology, and skills’ (Eyoh and Sandbrook 2003: 252), has
introduced new influences on scarcity as it is invoked and
experienced within national borders. Critical choices may now
be made by corporate managers, portfolio investors or bureau-
crats in multilateral financial institutions half a world away;
their priorities, in turn, create new incentive structures for
domestic actors. The section of the article that follows expands
on these points, in a way that is necessarily stylized and
selective.4
Globalization and scarcity in an
interconnected world
Uruguayan-born essayist Eduardo Galeano (2000: 166)
describes globalization as ‘a magic galleon that spirits factories
away to poor countries’. Reorganization of production and
many forms of service provision across multiple national
borders over the past few decades (Dicken 2007) has placed
jurisdictions into intense competition to attract foreign invest-
ment and contract production. A senior official of the US
Department of the Treasury during the Reagan–Bush era
described the competition more graphically than is usual in
the academic literature: ‘The countries that do not make
themselves more attractive will not get investors’ attention. This
is like a girl trying to get a boyfriend. She has to go out, have
her hair done up, wear makeup . . . .’ (David Mulford, quoted by
Henwood 1993). Combined with a doubling in the size of the
global workforce as India, China and the transition economies
opened to foreign investment, the effect has been to generate
strong downward pressure on wages and working conditions.
In particular, the threat of ‘exit’ (to a lower-cost jurisdiction)
has shifted the balance of power decisively in favour of
corporate managements. Distributional conflicts are no longer
contained within national borders and governments in many
LMICs find it attractive to attract investment by way of ‘the
discipline of labour’ (Amsden 1990). A number of additional
processes can be identified as contributing to scarcities of
resources for health in LMICs. Only some are described here,
since my intention is not to offer a comprehensive critique of
globalization based on its effects on health, but to show the
value of a particular way of studying it.
Trade agreements provide essential legal infrastructure for
global reorganization of production, and may effectively
‘constitutionalize’ it by creating formidable economic and
legal obstacles to reversing trade liberalization and other
elements of market-oriented economic policy (Grinspun and
Kreklewich 1994; Schneiderman 2000).5 In 1995, the world
entered a new era of trade policy with the creation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) regime and its binding
dispute resolution procedures; since then, bilateral and regional
trade and investment treaties that often go beyond the
provisions of the WTO framework have proliferated. The
content of these agreements routinely reflects the unequal
bargaining power of the parties, arising in the first instance
from differences in market size: access to the US market (for
instance) is more significant for a small economy like Ecuador
or Guatemala than its domestic markets will ever be to the US
or European Union. These disparities affect not only the
negotiation of trade agreements but the conditions under
which parties make use of dispute resolution procedures
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2004).
Major losses of livelihood can sometimes be traced directly to
competition from low-cost, perhaps highly subsidized imports
newly permitted into an LMIC market (Jeter 2002; Atarah
2005; Buechler 2006; de Ita 2008); workers and agricultural
producers are, if not impoverished, driven into precarious
employment or the informal economy. Tariffs are among the
easiest forms of revenue for governments to collect, which is
why at least until recently they were a major element in LMIC
revenue streams, and still are for some countries. Tariff
reductions undertaken as part of trade liberalization slashed
these revenues, arguably compounding the effects of competi-
tion for investment. The treasuries of some low-income
countries, in particular, still have not recovered (Baunsgaard
and Keen 2005; Glenday 2006; Baunsgaard and Keen 2010),
leading to reduced fiscal capacity for public spending on areas
such as education and health, although detailed country-
specific assessments are hard to find.
More visible and familiar are effects on access to essential
medicines associated with requirements for harmonizing intel-
lectual property (IP) protection under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) (Correa
2009). As originally drafted, TRIPS would have enabled
pharmaceutical manufacturers to charge whatever price the
traffic would bear by eliminating existing legal options to issue
compulsory licenses, produce generic versions, or import these
from elsewhere. Several years of negotiation post-1995 led to
official reinterpretations that restored some of these options,
but cumbersome and complicated procedures impede their use
(Haakonsson and Richey 2007; Kerry and Lee 2007; Muzaka
2009). Of equal concern is the tendency of the United States, in
particular, to negotiate IP provisions that go beyond TRIPS in
bilateral and regional agreements, undermining flexibilities
previously negotiated and creating new barriers to producing
or importing essential medicines at affordable prices (Roffe
et al. 2008; Shaffer and Brenner 2009; Muzaka 2011). For a
cash-strapped LMIC public sector health system, and for the
majority of the population in countries where most medicines
are still paid for out-of-pocket, the link between globalization,
scarcity and health could not be clearer.
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Trade agreements often incorporate provisions facilitating the
flow of investment across borders, and limiting the regulation
of such flows. Such provisions along with competitive financial
deregulation, especially in the United States and the United
Kingdom, have led to the emergence of a worldwide financial
marketplace in which considerable power has shifted from
national polities to a global capital market that ‘now has the
power to discipline national governments . . . . These markets
can now exercise the accountability functions associated with
citizenship: they can vote governments’ economic policies in or
out, they can force governments to take certain measures and
not others’ (Sassen 2003: 70; see generally Schrecker 2009). In
the aftermath of Mexico’s 1994–95 financial crisis, a former
head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) described the
consequences for governments that fail to manage their
economies in accordance with the priorities of this ‘global,
cross-border economic electorate’ (Sassen 2003: 70) as ‘swift,
brutal and destabilizing’ (Camdessus 1995).
Along with the growth of private banking (Anon 1990) and
the multiplication of opportunities to manipulate prices charged
in trade between firms that are part of the same corporate
organization, the global financial marketplace facilitates capital
flight: a process in which domestic elites shift their wealth out
of a jurisdiction, sometimes but not always illegally, in search
of higher returns and lower risks. Capital flight is of special
importance for understanding scarcity in LMICs because it
deprives nations of desperately needed resources that could be
used for investment in development or health (Helleiner 2001).
To indicate the magnitudes involved, Ndikumana and Boyce
(2011) estimate the value of capital flight from 33 sub-Saharan
countries plus imputed interest between 1970 and 2008 at
US$944 billion (in 2008 dollars), much of this figure related to
straightforward looting through misappropriation of loans and
trade misinvoicing. They estimate that on average 60 cents of
every dollar received from external lenders left those countries
as flight capital in the same year, and that the resulting reduction
in public spending on health was responsible for 77 000 infant
deaths per year in 2005–07 (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011: 82).
Further, capital flight has often magnified sovereign debt crises
that ushered in an era in which many countries lost control of
their domestic policies to the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Structural adjustment entered the development policy lexicon
in the early 1980s, when the World Bank and IMF—institutions
dominated by the G7 countries—began large-scale loan pro-
grammes to ensure that indebted LMICs could repay their
external creditors. The urgency of such lending grew after 1982,
when the possibility of Mexican default on loans made by US
banks threatened the stability of financial systems in the
industrialized world. Loans were conditional on a relatively
standard package of policies emphasizing deregulation, privat-
ization of state-owned firms, reduction of domestic government
spending, trade liberalization with the aim of prioritizing
production for export and elimination of controls on foreign
investment. The ostensible aim was to create conditions for
sustained economic growth in countries where they were
applied. By the mid-1980s, informed observers were critical of
this expectation (see e.g. Lever and Huhne 1985: 64); in
retrospect, it is clear that the measures were designed to protect
creditor interests, and also to advance a larger project of
refashioning the world economy on investor-friendly lines
(Przeworski et al. 1995: 5; Babb 2002: 1).
Resulting economic dislocations and domestic austerity meas-
ures often had destructive effects on livelihoods and other
social determinants of health, which were demonstrated as
early as 1987 by a ten-country UNICEF study (Cornia et al.
1987). Subsequent reviews of the evidence have found a
preponderance of negative effects on health (Breman and
Shelton 2007; Stuckler and Basu 2009) and probably understate
these effects because, except in the most drastic cases, it is hard
to capture the long-term health consequences of deteriorating
socio-economic conditions using epidemiological standards of
proof (Pfeiffer and Chapman 2010). Opportunities for capital
flight often meant that the costs of adjustment were borne
primarily by those who did not have the option of shifting their
assets out of the country; publicly financed rescues of
collapsing domestic banks (Halac and Schmukler 2004;
Mannsberger and McBride 2007) are a case in point. Thus,
the adjustment process imperiled the livelihoods (and oppor-
tunities to lead healthy lives) of many while wealth and
economic opportunity were shifted upward to the few.
At least before 2008 the IMF had become less important as a
source of last-resort lending, but remained powerful as a
gatekeeper for development assistance and debt relief
(Gore 2004). IMF approval is also valued as assurance to
private investors that a country’s macroeconomic policies are
sound (Sachs 1998). Considerable evidence suggests that the
era of structural adjustment is not over. IMF policy apprehen-
sions about ‘fiscal expansion’ (Working Group on IMF
Programs and Health Spending 2007), based on textbook
microeconomics and public finance, have continued to limit
countries’ ability to spend on health and education (Ooms and
Schrecker 2005; Centre for Economic Governance and AIDS in
Africa and RESULTS Educational Fund 2009). For example,
IMF insistence on public expenditure ceilings led to a situation
in which ‘thousands of trained nurses and other health workers
remain[ed] unemployed’ in Kenya circa 2006, and thousands
more had left the country in search of work elsewhere, ‘despite
a health worker shortage across all health programs’ (Korir and
Kioko 2009: 2).
The history of structural adjustment shows that economic
policies and institutions cannot be understood in isolation from
imperial geopolitics and policy. The hegemonic role of the
United States was captured in a 1990 codification of emerging,
market-oriented wisdom as the Washington consensus,
responding to a political climate that ‘was essentially contemp-
tuous of equity concerns’ (Williamson 1993: 1329). By the early
years of this century, the aggressive unilateralism of the Bush
II administration had moved the concept of US imperialism
into the academic mainstream (Falk 2004), and it is useful to
view many aspects of globalization’s recent history, in addition
to the politics of World Bank and IMF-driven economic
restructuring, from this vantage point. Consider for example
US support for coups d’e´tat in countries like Iran and
Guatemala dating back to the 1950s and subsequent assistance
to homicidal but market-friendly regimes, like Pinochet’s in
Chile and various governments and counterinsurgency move-
ments in Central America. President Reagan’s Central American
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policies led to the deaths of some 200 000 people and drove
several times that number into exile, many into subaltern
positions as undocumented workers in the United States
(see generally Robinson 2003), creating a landscape of social
and economic desolation from which many countries in the
region are only starting to heal. Reagan administration policies
included financing political formations like the right-wing
Salvadoran think tank Fundacio´n Salvadoren˜a para el
Desarrollo Econo´mico y Social (Salvadoran Foundation for
Economic and Social Development) (FUSADES) in El Salvador,
which in 1990 ran advertisements urging foreign investors in
the garment industry to hire ‘Rosa’ at 57 cents an hour. In
1991, Rosa’s advertised price dropped to 33 cents an hour
(Kernaghan 1997). Thus, we are brought back to Galeano’s
magic galleon and Mulford’s beauty contest, and to the
fundamental point that resource scarcities in the context of
health policy must always be understood with reference to their
origins in political choices and macro-scale social and economic
processes.
Market fundamentalism and the
construction of scarcity
Interrogating scarcity advances that understanding, but is not a
set of substantive principles of justice. Methodologically, the
strategy presupposes only Calabresi and Bobbitt’s generic
scepticism about scarcity. That presupposition distinguishes it
from the mainstream approach exemplified by Daniels and
Sabin’s effort to find procedural solutions to problems of
scarcity associated with the operation of private, for-profit
managed care organizations in the United States, while not
questioning the justice of the basic organization of health care
provision and the health care industry (see Figures 1 and 2)
(Daniels and Sabin 1997). Such efforts often degenerate into
calls for ‘practices that can be sustained and that connect well
with the goals of various stakeholders in the many institutional
settings where these decisions are made’ (Daniels 2000: 1300),
eschewing questions about the origins of scarcity. Such
procedural solutions are worthwhile in a broad range of
situations in which the goals of ‘stakeholders’ are ethically
defensible and structural inequalities of power and resources
not extreme,6 but that defensibility cannot be presumed; no
procedural algorithm will humanize Sophie’s choice. In the
international frame of reference, interrogating scarcity norma-
tively implies only a weak, generic cosmopolitanism that
regards drivers of scarcity that originate outside the jurisdic-
tion’s borders as prima facie appropriate for ethical analysis. In
other words, the proposition that we (whoever we are) have
obligations related to the health of non-compatriots is not
rejected out of hand, but the content and limits of those
obligations are not specified.
Interrogating scarcity is thus congruent with (indeed exem-
plified by) Pogge’s powerful argument that global responsibility
is inescapable given the nature of historical and contemporary
interconnections, as embodied in economic institutions as well
as discrete policy choices. His central point is that ethical
responsibility for health disparities follows causal responsibility
across national borders, in particular with respect to the health
damage that is associated with extreme poverty (Pogge 2002;
Pogge 2004; Pogge 2005; Pogge 2007b). ‘By avoidably producing
severe poverty, economic institutions substantially contribute to
the incidence of many medical conditions. Persons materially
involved in upholding such economic institutions are then
materially involved in the causation of such medical conditions’
(Pogge 2004: 137).
Pogge’s attribution of responsibility depends on the existence
of plausible alternative sets of institutions that would be more
conducive to reducing or eliminating poverty. As shown in the
preceding section of the article, this test is not difficult to meet.
One can readily imagine alternative policies of ‘adjustment with
a human face’, in the words of the UNICEF study of structural
adjustment impacts cited earlier; a regime of international law
in which health-related obligations under human rights treaties
would ‘trump’ demands for macroeconomic policies that
exacerbate shortages of health workers and restrict access to
essential medicines (Pogge 2007a); or—leaving aside for the
moment the formidable political obstacles (Stiglitz and
Charlton 2005)—an international trade policy regime ‘in
which trade rules are determined so as to maximize develop-
ment potential, particularly of the poorest nations in the world’
(Rodrik 2001). Pogge notes the pernicious consequences of the
‘resource privilege’, which permits rulers to dispose of natural
resources within their borders even when they remain un-
accountable for the use of the revenues—think of how little
revenue from exploitation of oil resources reaches the majority
of Nigerians or Angolans—and the ‘borrowing privilege’, which
permits rulers to incur external debts on behalf of subjects who
may have no meaningful opportunity to accept or reject these
obligations. This latter characteristic of the international order,
in particular, could be changed by national policies or multi-
lateral agreements that defined such debts as ‘odious’ under
international law (King et al. 2003; Mandel 2006; Ndikumana
and Boyce 2011: 84–95).
Interrogating scarcity can therefore provide factual founda-
tions for prescriptive statements about global justice that apply
to local situations. It is also a promising basis for research at
the interface of ethics and the social sciences that connects
global-scale power relations and domestic political choices with
the ways in which health-related scarcities are experienced
differently, and the options for addressing them framed
differently, by various protagonists on the ground. Exemplary
work in this vein has been done on water, access to which is a
key social determinant of health. In a case study of a particular
district in India, Mehta (2007) has shown that scarcities of
water must be understood with reference to local histories of
human activity, and that the range of remedies considered
feasible—in this instance, a contentious major dam project
being actively promoted by the World Bank—may be defined by
alliances of powerful domestic and external actors. Both Mehta
and Mirosa Canal (2004) and Goldman (2007) have connected
local constructions of scarcity with the projects of powerful
supranational actors, including transnational water utility
corporations, as they promote private investment in water
service provision. Mehta and Mirosa Canal (2004: 4–7) are also
explicit in identifying IMF/World Bank conditionalities as
having created the conditions in which private provision of
water as a marketed commodity appeared as the only viable
solution. A useful parallel can be drawn with the Bank’s
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aggressive advocacy of market-oriented health sector ‘reform’
on the basis that private purchase of care or insurance was
the norm from which all departures required justification
(Laurell and Arellano 1996; Lee and Goodman 2002; Lister and
Labonte´ 2009). Srivastava (2010) makes a similar point about
the World Bank’s preference for market-based strategies in its
role as a major supplier of development assistance for educa-
tion, emphasizing that ‘while developing countries have con-
strained public budgets, the persistence of scarce resources for
education, particularly for basic education, is not a fixed
variable. It exists because we let it’ (p. 525).
Further comparative research on scarcity in the context of
social determinants of health—including water and education,
but also such factors as food security, adequate income and
access to health care itself—will clearly be useful. The examples
just cited indicate that contemporary constructions of scarcity
must be situated with reference to what Somers (2008) has
called market fundamentalism (in preference to neoliberalism,
the more familiar terminology but confusing to North American
audiences), the institutions that promote it and its local
particularities. Market fundamentalism presumes that markets
are the normal and natural basis for organizing almost all areas
of human activity; assigns a heavy burden of proof to those
who would organize human interactions on any other basis;
and tends to define citizenship in terms of participation in
markets, as a producer and (informed) consumer. Market
fundamentalism is the value system at the core of contempor-
ary globalization (Harvey 2005; Ward and England 2007), and
infuses the construction of scarcity in many public policy
contexts. In addition to the illustrations already provided, Lurie
et al. (2008) observe, without evident appreciation of the irony,
that health care organizations in the United States often insist
that a ‘business case’ needs to be made for interventions to
reduce health disparities, based on their anticipated return on
investment. A 2008 think tank report characterized the US
President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief, which has
financed antiretroviral therapy for a million people, as a ‘state
supported international welfare program’ that was ‘hard to
justify on investment grounds’ (Over 2008). And Ruiters (2006;
2009) interprets policies that provide free, but seriously inad-
equate minimal increments of water and electricity to the poor
in South Africa, thereafter charging users on a cost-recovery
basis with disconnection automated through installation of
prepaid meters, as a strategy of social control concerned with
inculcating a ‘payment morality’ (in the words of the
Department of Finance), while implicitly conceding that
domestic poverty can only be managed rather than substan-
tially reduced.
This discussion may appear to have wandered far from issues
of health, but that is not the case if the frame of reference
includes social determinants of health, as it should. Rather,
inquiry into how scarcities are constructed and maintained
returns health policy to the insights of an earlier era, notably
Virchow’s about the importance of political as well as patho-
logical causes of disease. Against today’s background of
financial markets with global reach and widespread invocations
of the need for austerity in which governments are seldom
challenged as they ritualistically turn their pockets out and
complain that the cupboard is bare, neither disease causation
nor health ethics can sensibly be separated from politics and
economics. Redefining the scope of health ethics and health
policy analysis will inevitably encounter objections based on the
impracticality of interrogating scarcity, or at least its irrelevance
to daily operational contexts. The appropriate reply comes from
feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon (1987: 70), addressing
the limits of incremental approaches to eliminating sex
discrimination: ‘You may think that I’m not being very
practical. I have learned that practical means something that
can be done while keeping everything else the same’.
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Endnotes
1 An admittedly ambiguous term, which I take to include prescriptive or
normative analysis of how decisions that affect health should be
made both in clinical settings and in the broader universe of
settings that are relevant to public or population health.
2 In Canada, a Medical Officer of Health is a physician and the senior
public servant in a municipal or regional public health organization
that provides a range of preventive and protective interventions,
including assuming responsibility for communicable disease con-
trol in the event of outbreaks; such units do not usually provide
clinical services.
3 Wellington (2000, Chapter 1) makes this point with reference to the
dilemma in moral reasoning presented by Lawrence Kohlberg, in
which a poor man is faced with the choice between stealing a drug
he cannot afford or watching his wife die for want of the drug.
Discussing Carol Gilligan’s restatement of the dilemma, Wellington
points out that neither Kohlberg nor Gilligan asks a rather obvious
question: why does the drug cost so much? The answer takes us
into the realm of the international political economy of intellectual
property rights, scientific research and the political power of the
pharmaceutical industry.
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4 For more extensive treatments see, for example, Yong Kim et al.
(2000); Labonte´ et al. (2009); Gill and Bakker (2011).
5 The investor-state dispute resolution provisions (Chapter 11) of the
North American Free Trade Agreement are a case in point.
6 In particular, no ‘stakeholder’ must be able to define the permissible
limits of discussion or to terminate the deliberation altogether—as
for instance when corporate managers threaten to relocate
production to another jurisdiction in response to demands for
adequate livelihoods and elimination of exposure to workplace
hazards, or the propertied can use the prospect of capital flight to
limit redistributive policies.
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